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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE :-An unusual
question of causation was presented in St. Louis-San Francisco R.
Co. v. Ginn' decided by a five to three decision of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.
Plaintiff, a farmer, took his tractor and plowed a fire guard
around his meadow in an attempt to minimize the damage from a
fire spreading from the defendant railroad company's right of way.
While taking the tractor to a place of safety, he ran over a root or
branch which flew up striking his eye. The court held he could recover from the defendant for the injury.
The majority opinion said that since plaintiff was not at the
place of his own volition and was not doing an act of his own choosing, that equitably he should not be required to bear the loss resulting from his personal injuries. They stated that under these circumstances the injury flowed directly from the fire and consequently the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury. The dissenting opinion was based on the idea of proximate
cause being the natural and probable consequence of the negligence
and stated that the majority opinion unduly extended the doctrine.
In this case the majority opinion recognized the split of judicial opinion which has long been a problem in determining the
extent of proximate cause. It adopted as the better rule that of
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Siler 2 in which a woman was burned to
death while trying to protect her property from a fire negligently
started by the defendant on its right of way. It was there held that
since the injury wouldn't have occurred except for the railroad's
negligence, and the only intervening cause was plaintiff's voluntary act to save property, which defendant might reasonably have
foreseen, the fire was the proximate cause of the injury.
The court in this case refused to follow the case of Seale v.
Gulf,3 which held that the act of the person intervening to save
property becomes the proximate cause of the injury and relieves
the original wrongdoer of liability. In rejecting this theory the majority followed the action of an earlier Oklahoma decision, Merritt
v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 4 and apparently reaffirmed the position taken in City of Altus v. Wise5 that any intervening cause must
entirely supersede and be independent of the original negligence to
become the proximate cause.
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The position taken by the dissent, however, is not without support; an earlier Oklahoma decision, Mathers v. Younger, 6 based
proximate cause on, "natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by independent cause, without which there would be no injury."
This followed the reasoning of a still earlier Oklahoma case, 7 to the
effect that an intervening act would break the causal connection
unless it should have been anticipated. A recent Kansas decision 8
follows this line of thought by stressing the conjunction in natural
and probable consequences in determining proximate cause.
In rejecting the defendant's contention that such an incident
as we had here couldn't have been foreseen by any degree of care,
the Oklahoma court undoubtedly felt that it was not necessary
that the particular injury should have been foreseen, but only that
some injury might have been foreseen. In effect the court used a
form. of estoppel based on plaintiff's being present because of tHe
defendant's negligence. This is shown by the language saying, "Defendant should not be permitted to say plaintiff's act was voluntary
and that the injuries received didn't flow directly from defendant's
wrong."9
It would seem that, although the majority opinion was on solid
ground in its reasoning, the conclusion they reached stretches the
concept of proximate cause to the utmost. While the doctrine of
proximate cause has been sporadically extended since the time of
the famous Squib Case, 10 practicality and logic demand some limitation be placed on the liability which can accrue from an act such as
occurred here. Judicial attempts to unravel the fabric of interwoven acts making up cause and effect and thus enlarge liability
by means of the doctrine should be within some limitation. There
has been reluctance, however, to place any such limitation on liability, and the principal case seems to be in line with the modern
tendency toward extension of the doctrine of proximate cause
wherever possible.
JERROLD T. LYNCH
8177 Okla. 294, 58 P.2d 857 (1936).
'Chicago R.I.&P. R. Co. v. Moore, 360 Okla. 450, 129 P. 67 (1912).
1 Shideler v. Habiger, 172 Kans. 718, 243 P.2d 211, (1952).
9St. Louis, etc. v. Ginn, supra.
0Scott v. Shepard, 2 W.B.1. 892.
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